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Abstract: Southern Africa currently faces several challenges threatening the 
regional’s security architecture. Many of these challenges are inter connected and 
can be identified as causes of insecurity or factors contributing to insecurity, and 
take many forms, including governance issues, intra-state conflicts, and social 
inequality and election manipulations. Moreover, they constitute a major 
impediment to the socio-economic development of the African continent. This paper 
draws upon mostly primary sources including treaties, protocols, reports, 
communiqué, and statements, as well as secondary information from previous 
research.Based on data from official documents and qualitative interviews, this 
paper found that SADC lacks the capacity and culture to deal with some of the 
challenges facing the region. And its legal and political framework in dealing with 
some of challenges is seriously questioned. Thus the regional body needs time and 
more experience for the successful evolvement in dealing with variety of challenges 
and crises such as unconstitutional government changes in Southern Africa. The 
paper recommended that SADC member states must strengthen regional body, and 
they must enhance the capacities of the regional security architecture in order to 
address challenges pertaining to the region.  
 




Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Southern African region has 
been peaceful and stable compared to other regions in Africa 
(Hammerstad, 2005: 77; SADC, 2010b: 45), largely due to the dramatic end 
of the Cold War in the late 1980s, which was most intense in the region 
compared to other areas of Africa. The end of the Cold War contributed to 
the significant diminishing of threats to national and regional security 
following the ceasefires in Mozambique (1992), Angola (2002) and the 
Democratic Republican of Congo (DRC) (2003). In addition, peaceful 
democratic transformations from one-party states to multi-party states and 
the successful holding of periodic elections in some countries in the region, 
such as Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania 
contributed to an increasing stability in the region. 




However, as contended by Galtung (1990; 1996) and Klingebiel et al (2008) 
this stability does not constitute real peace, but rather simply the absence of 
war.2 The militarisation in the political arena, poverty, election 
manipulations, and violations of basic rights, communal violence and bad 
governance posing threats are also indicators of lack of real peace in the 
region. Often entire threats are purely internal and render some states in 
the region as hot spots for violence. Malawi, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, DRC, 
Comoros and Swaziland provide examples of Southern Africa region 
security challenges that SADC as a regional organisation needs to attend to. 
These countries manifest the consequences of governance deficit and 
problems of democratic transition. In a nut shell, the SADC region is facing 
an “erosion of democracy” partly caused by a failure of regional leaders to 
live up to their own agreements concerning the rule of law.   
 
Against this background this paper discussed the challenges to the peace 
and security facing SADC region. In this paper term SADC region refers 
the areas in East and Southern Africa occupied by member states of SADC, 
which are Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. The discussion is divided into four sections. It 
begins with an overview of the literature related with linkage between 
security and regionalisms. Subsequently, the challenges to peace and 
security facing Southern Africa are addressed in the third section. It will 
consider the attempts by SADC to address challenges to peace and security 
facing the regional. This paper also seeks to explore the strengths and 
weaknesses of SADC in addressing political crises emanating from bad 
governance, unconstitutional changes of government and contested 
electoral results. These problems are among the most prominent sources of 
instability confronted by SADC. Lastly the paper discusses why most of the 
challenges persist despite all effort to address it from SADC and its 
member states. It finalise with conclusion and some suggestion on how to 
address those challenges. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The paper is derived from field trips conducted by the author in April, May 
in 2014 and June in 2015 in the SADC Headquarters in Gaborone. The 
purpose of the journey was to meet with SADC officials in Gaborone to 
                                                 
2According to Galtung (1990, 1996) and Klingibiel (2008) Peace does not mean the total 
absence of any conflict, but rather the absence of violence in all forms and the unfolding of 
conflict in a constructive way. Peace therefore exists where people are interacting non-
violently and are managing their conflict positively-with respectful attention to the 
legitimate needs and interest of all concerned.  





discuss on the issue related to peace and security in Southern Africa. The 
paper also heavily draws from detailed interviews and numerous 
discussions since April 2014 with diplomats, military officers, and foreign 
officials and leading analysts on regional and continental security in Africa. 
In addition, official documents from SADC and other publications obtained 
in the libraries and online sources were reviewed. The principal documents 
for evaluation include the SADC Treaty, Strategic Indicative Plan for the 
Organ (SIPO), SADC resolution related to DRC, Madagascar, Lesotho, and 
Zimbabwe, treaties, protocols, declarations, reports, communiqué, 
statements, and previous research findings from different research 
institutions on SADC and its institutions. These documents were accessed 
through different means; that is, from relevant authorities in Gaborone and 
on their official website. 
 
LITERATURE CONSIDERATION 
The available literature indicates that security and regionalism have been 
on the African agenda since the wave of most African states’ independence 
in the early 1960s (van Walraven, 1999, 2010; Franke, 2009; Lisakafu, 2013). 
SADC as an inter-governmental and multipurpose regional organisation 
was established in August 1992. The organisation committed member 
states to eleven principle objectives, most of which revolved around 
promoting self-sustaining development, economic growth, socio-economic 
development and poverty alleviation through regional integration; 
consolidating, defending and maintaining democracy, peace, security and 
stability; promoting common political values and institutions that are 
democratic, legitimate and effective; achieving complementarity between 
national and regional strategies and programmes; the mobilisation of 
regional and international private and public resources for the 
development of the region; combating deadly and communicable diseases; 
and main-streaming gender in the process of community building (SADC, 
1992: 5). 
 
In order to achieve the objectives set out in Article 5(1) and Article 5(2) of 
the Treaty, it outlines ten strategies and projects, including harmonising 
political and socio-economic policies and plans of member states; 
cementing cultural ties across the region and human resources 
development; promoting the coordination and harmonisation of member 
states’ international relations; and creating appropriate institutions and 
mechanisms for the mobilisation of requisite resources for the 
implementation of programmes and operations of the SADC and its 
institutions.  




Article 4 of the SADC treaty provides five principles that commit SADC 
and its member states to the sovereign equality of all member states; 
solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy, the rule of law; 
equity, balance and mutual benefit, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
Additionally, SADC member states agreed to co-operate in certain areas, 
including politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security, 
food security, land and agriculture, infrastructure and services, industry, 
trade, investment and finances, human resource development, science and 
technology, natural resources and environment; social welfare, information 
and culture (SADC, 1992a: 21(3)(a-g)).  
 
SADC was preceded by the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC), which was founded in Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April 
1980 (SADCC, 1980). The organisation was originally an alliance of 
Frontline States (FLS), whose main objectives involved the political 
liberation of Southern African states and their defence against aggression 
by the South African apartheid regime. At that time, the nature of the 
security cooperation was held as a combination of formal and informal 
nature, and aimed at lobbying for the liberation of Angola, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Realising that economic 
development and security were closely interlinked, in 1996 SADC member 
states decided to establish the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
(OPDS), a security regime with the purpose of preventing, managing and 
resolving regional conflicts primarily through peaceful means, and also 
promoting political, defence and security cooperation among member 
states (SADC, 1996).3 
 
During the process of strengthening its peace and security mechanism, 
SADC member states signed the Mutual Defence Pact in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania on  26 August 2003 (SADC, 2003: para. 40). The aim of the pact 
was to provide mechanisms for preventing conflict between SADC 
countries and with other countries, and furthermore for SADC member 
states to act together against outside aggressions. At the time of writing this 
paper both the OPDSC Protocol and Mutual Defence Pact were not yet 
signed and ratified by all member states.  
 
The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) was also approved on 26 
August 2003 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and launched by SADC’s Head of 
States and Government in August 2004 in Mauritius (SADC, 2003, 2003: 
para.37, 2004: para.7, 2005: 11; 2010: 6). The SIPO is a five-year strategic 
                                                 
3See Makinda and Okumu 2008: 55 for a similar observation. 





plan policy document that was established with the aim of providing 
guidelines and strategies for the implementation of the objectives of the 
Organ Protocol. Thus, in 2007 SADC officials started the process of 
reviewing and re-evaluating SIPO in order to ensure it is in line with 
changing circumstances in SADC region (SADC, 2010a: 19; 2012: 5). As will 
be discussed later, the evaluation process was successfully completed on 20 
November 2012 after a second edition. The revised SIPO was officially 
launched in Arusha, Tanzania (SADC, 2012).4 
 
The brief review provided above highlights that SADC passed through 
different phases of security cooperation in the region prior to reaching the 
current regional peace and security architecture (Cilliers, 1995, 1999; Malan, 
1998; Omari and Macaringue, 2007). However, within this new peace and 
security architecture, the conflict management component in SADC body 
now focuses on diplomatic means for conflict resolutions, exemplified by 
attempts to address the insecurity situations in Zimbabwe, DRC, 
Madagascar and Lesotho. Later on in this paper provide a detailed 
explanation of how the regional body addresses various challenges arising 
in member states. 
 
LINKAGE BETWEEN PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONALISM 
As emphasised from the aforementioned discussion, there is a strong 
linkage between peace, security, the tendency of local conflicts to be 
regionalised, and a need for conflict resolution to be embedded in regional 
security arrangements. This implies close linkages between peace, security 
and regionalism as referred to by several scholars as “security regionalism” 
(Buzzan, 1991; Hettne, 2008: 403-404; Söderbaum and Hettne, 2010: 16; 
Söderbaum, 2015:120), that is regional dimensions of security (Hettne, 2008: 
403). 
 
Prior to proceeding further with this discussion, it is useful to clarify the 
meaning of the term “region”, because the two terms “region” and 
“regionalism” are widely used in the field of International Relations (IR), 
yet defining these terms has been a difficult task within IR literature 
(Godehardt and Nabers, 2011: 2-3; Paul, 2012: 4). In the political arena, the 
term “region” refers to space and place (i.e. territorial unit/geographic area 
such as Africa, Europe or Asia), whereas “regionalism” as the formation of 
and policies pursued by inter-state groups based around regions has stood 
                                                 
4The first version of the SIPO covered 2004-2009. The updated version- The Harmonised 
Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO II) covers the period 2010-2015.  
(http://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/) (24.12.2014). 




the test of time (Nye, 1968). Also it denotes an aim or objectives (Paasi, 
1996: 208; Tavares, 2004). Nevertheless, several authors consider two issues 
in defining the term region: the role of state and geographical proximity 
(Godehardt and Nabers, 2011: 3). For instance, Nye (1968: xii) defines 
region as a limited number of states linked together by a geographical 
relationship and a degree of mutual interdependence. Thompson (1973: 
101) regards region as patterns of relations or interactions within a 
geographic area that exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity 
to the extent that a change at one point in these patterns affects others. The 
above definitions show that regionalism and state power do not stand in 
opposition to one another, and that states remain an essential building 
block from which arrangements are constructed. Based on the above 
definitions, in the context of this study regionalism is regarded as the 
willingness of states in the region to co-operate in order to deal with 
common problems or challenges. 
 
However, there are two definitions of security: a traditional (narrow) and 
more recent (broader). The traditional concept of security is based on a 
state’s ability to defend itself against external threats. As Walt (1991) 
articulates, this is a position in which security is state-centric and restricted 
to the military realm. Traditional security has been seen as closely related 
to the threat or use of violence and military means regarded as central to 
the provision of security.5 This is typically related to the notion of “regime 
security” and particularly closely linked to the nature of the post-colonial 
African states, whereby the ruling state’s elites are more concerned with the 
security of the regime (state) than the state as a whole. Thus, they employ a 
mix of internal and external security strategies aimed at regime survival 
(Clapham, 1996: 120; Jackson, 2007: 154-155). Internally, ruling elites create 
policies designed to protect them from internal threats, including the 
expansion of security forces and their use in suppressing opponents. 
Externally, they tend to join alliances with external powerful actor(s) to 
boost regime security by providing a degree of international legitimacy and 
preventing external threats. Furthermore, they can join other neighbouring 
states in regional security arrangements primarily designed to support each 
other, as exemplified by the formation of the SADC, AU and ECOWAS.   
The above perspective of security is based on the nation state and has been 
challenged by many scholars given that the problems faced by the SADC 
and Africa in general cannot be solved by a single state acting individually. 
National security challenges require a transnational approach founded 
                                                 
5Theoretically, traditional security view bases on a realist theory pioneered by the German-
American scholars Hans J. Morgenthau. The normative core of this theory is national 
security and state survival (see Jackson and Sorenses 2007: 60).  





upon a states’ co-operation, and a coordinated strategy that responds to 
military, political and social challenges. Therefore, in the early 1990s, and 
after the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) presented 
human development reports that redefined the concept of security as 
security for people rather than land or territories, a new term of “human 
security” was introduced. This emphasised that new concepts of security 
must focus on the security of people (i.e. human security), and not only of 
nations; “human security” is described as one of the five pillars of a people-
centred world order (UNDP, 1993: 2).6 In the following year, UNDP argued 
that “security” pertains to “people rather than territories and development 
rather than arms”, identifying seven sub-areas of “human security”: 
economic, political, food, health, environmental, personal and community 
(UNDP, 1994).7 
 
 Similarly, the ICISS report explains that human security means the security 
of people, namely their physical safety, economic and social well-being, 
respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of 
their human rights and fundamental freedoms (ICISS, 2001: 15). Despite 
minor differences in each of the above definitions, they commonly 
emphasise a “widening” of the security concept beyond the national level 
of states and considering other perspectives such as environmental, health 
and economic factors.  
 
In linking security and regionalism, Hettne (2008: 404) notes that these two 
terms could be related in many different ways depending on the unit of 
investigation or approach chosen. For example, through the Regional 
Security Complex Theory Buzan (1991: 190) views security regionalism as a 
group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently 
closely that their national security cannot be realistically considered 
separate from each other. Another potential linkage between regionalism 
and security was clearly highlighted with former Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros Ghali's in his report “An Agenda for Peace”8, which was 
written in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The report provided 
analysis relates to United Nations (UN) peacemaking, peacekeeping and 
preventive diplomacy-task which regional arrangements such as AU, 
                                                 
6 Other pillars include: new models of sustainable human development; new partnerships 
between state and markets; new patterns of national and global governance; and new 
forms of international cooperation (UNDP 1993: 2). 
7 See also Evans 2008: 34-35 for similar observation. 
8 Butros Butros-Ghali, an Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping, United Nations: New York 1992. 




ASEAN and SADC were invited to share. This is due to the multiple 
challenges facing the UN system have encouraged regional arrangements  
in Africa and elsewhere in the worlds to take on much more active roles in 
the area of security. 
 
As exemplified by the above brief overview of linkage between security 
and regionalism, the challenges to peace and security in Southern Africa 
and Africa in general are diverse and pose great demands on regional 
security apparatus. As it will be discuss in detail below, some of these 
challenges emanating from bad governance, unconstitutional changes of 
government, and unequal distribution of resources among citizens among 
citizens and contested electoral results. These challenges are among the 
most prominent sources of instability confronted by SADC. 
 
Challenges to Peace and Security in Southern Africa 
The challenges facing Southern Africa in terms of peace and security have 
been discussed for years. Moreover, the overall challenges facing the SADC 
region apply to other regions of Africa to a significant extent. Such 
challenges have purely emanated from domestic affairs and governance-
related issues, resource allocation, unconstitutional changes of government 
and many other factors. A lack of good governance, intra-state conflicts and 
post-election-related violence remain serious challenges for most of the 
states in Africa, leading to serious security breakdowns and miserable 
living conditions for the people in the continent. Without neglecting other 
relevant issues concerning security challenges and attempting any 
hierarchical ordering of such challenges, this section focuses on the 
following challenges: lack of good governance, intra-state conflicts, 
election-related violence, lack of common political regional value, external 
interference, poverty, social inequality, and the shortage of funds. 
 
The first challenge relates to the lack of good governance. As mentioned in 
the introduction of this paper, almost all threats facing this region, and to a 
large extent other regions in Africa, purely originate from internal affairs of 
the states, with the “litany” of these threats emanating from the crises of 
good governance (Hendricks 2010: 6-7; SADC-CNGO, 2010: 8). According 
to Cawthra (2006: 90), failure of governance accelerated by lack of good 
governance constitutes the single most important factor behind the 
insecurity of many states in Southern Africa. Similarly, a SADC official 
pointed out during an interview that poor governance from most of the 
states in the region significantly contributes to insecurity and violence at 





national and regional levels.9 In this study, term “governance” is defined as 
the exercise of political power to manage the nation’s affairs. The lack of 
good governance is one of the major challenges behind many political 
crises in the region, marked by the phrase “lack of good governance” being 
repeatedly mentioned in one of the important policy documents of the 
SADC (SADC. 2003: 15; SADC-CNGO, 2010: 8). The state leaders of 
Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Swaziland and Angola have recently created their 
own “self-defense”, building up personal networks of influence rather than 
holding the all-powerful state accountable for its systemic failure. These 
state leaders have been accused of diverting state funds for their own 
benefits, running the countries they lead like their personal properties and 
refusing to hold credible elections. Consequently, the political field in the 
affected countries is uneven, with patronage essential in maintaining 
power.  
 
A SADC official interviewed added that most governments in Southern 
Africa have thus far failed to address the increasing cost of living, growing 
poverty, inequality in distribution of resources and corruption due to bad 
governance. When citizens demand government action towards addressing 
these problems, governments always react by using brutal force, with such 
cases witnessed in Zimbabwe, Angola and Swaziland. An increasing 
militarization of the state and use of armed forces to enforce law and order 
and quell peaceful protests, for example, in Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Angola 
and South Africa and neighbouring states in Burundi and Uganda, have 
exposed these countries to both political and economic crises; adversely 
affecting the entire population of the respective countries, with women and 
children often the most affected. Poor governance at national level, 
resulting in the state’s political and economic instability, can lead to 
instability within the region as an overwhelming number of illegal 
immigrants cross the porous international borders in search of a better life 
in nearby states. Therefore, conflict prone areas such as the DRC, 
Zimbabwe and Somalia have caused insecurity in the SADC region and the 
Horn of Africa at large. 
 
The second challenge is associated with poverty and social inequality. The 
SADC Regional Strategic Indicative Development Plan (RISDP) revealed 
poverty as one of the major development and security challenges facing the 
SADC region (SADC, –n.d.: 15).10 Several scholars have highlighted the 
SADC region as one of the areas in Africa with the poorest countries in the 
                                                 
9Interview with Habib Kambanga, Gaborone, Botswana, 04.05.2015. 
10 See also SADC 2003; Cawthra 2006: 89 for a similar observation. 




world, exemplified by around 40 percent of the whole region living on less 
than one US dollar per day (AU Monitor, 2008). Poverty and social 
inequality are due to bad governance, raising levels of unemployment and 
the majority of citizens’ inability to access basic needs.  In addition, the gap 
between the rich and poor is increasingly widening in Southern Africa, 
more than elsewhere in Africa. For example Namibia has one of the highest 
per capita GDPs in the SADC region. However, Tjatindi (2011) notes that 
most Namibians live in severe poverty due to large-scale unemployment, 
while a small proportion of the population enjoys the country’s wealth 
(Mail and Guardian, 05.10.2011). This paper describes the situation as 
“alarming due to the fact that when people’s grievances are not met, 
economic decline, extreme poverty and marginalised citizens might then 
reinforce tendencies to resolve to violent means. Accordingly, if African 
states and regional bodies do not properly address poverty and social 
inequality, there are high tendencies for conflicts erupting, with Admore 
Kambudzi suggesting that poverty represents the fundamental course of 
conflicts on the African continent.11  As will be later shown in this paper, 
SADC and member states come-up with many initiative to address the 
problem including roadmap for poverty reduction, termed RISDP which 
highlights poverty reduction and eradication as one of the overarching 
priorities within its integration agenda (SADC, n.d.: 55). Member states also 
address this poverty and social inequality through the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Plan (PRSP), and other strategies through the World Bank and 
IMF programmes. However, there has been no substantial relief, as masses 
of people in the region remain in extreme poverty, with Malawi, Zambia 
and Mozambique the most affected countries in the region.  
 
The third challenge is intra-states conflicts, which are perhaps the most 
significant challenges facing the Southern Africa regional and its people, 
with crises continuing to erupt without any sign of an end (SADC, 2003; 
AU, 2009: 21). The most recent intra-state conflicts in the region include 
those in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, DRC and Madagascar. Most of these crises are 
purely internal and have a negative impact on the socio-economic 
development of Africa. Kambudzi pointed out that intra-state conflicts 
have been the single most devastating challenges for the African 
continent.12 According to him, these conflicts come with different names 
such as election-related violence, rebel movements, guerrilla movements, 
or private armies, terrorists or secessionist bandits. Furthermore, they are 
made more complex and lethal by modern technology, modern 
                                                 
11Interview with Admore Kambudzi, Addis Ababa, 30.03.2015. 
12Ibid. 





communications and highly destructive weapons that pose serious 
challenges not just for individual states’ peace and security, but also to the 
region and Africa as a whole (ICISS, 2001: 4). A key characteristic of these 
conflicts in Africa is the deliberate targeting of violence on poor and 
vulnerable civilians, including children and women. The African 
Commission report (2005: 100) acknowledges that “the toll on human lives 
has been enormous: civil conflict causes as many deaths in Africa each year 
as epidemic diseases and is responsible for more death and displacement 
than famine or floods”.  
 
In addition, most of the intra-state conflicts often develop into cross-border 
wars and become a regional conflict (Jackson, 2002; Söderbaum, 2009; 
Dersso, 2010). For example, a conflict in the DRC has demonstrated how 
neighbouring states such as Tanzania, Zambia, Angola and Uganda 
become involved in one way or another, with a spillover effect on regional 
stability. The intra-state conflict in the DRC became a matter of 
international concern, forcing the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force. Such 
conflicts had a devastating effect on the economic growth of the continent, 
severely curtailing the realisation of regional objectives such as sustainable 
economic development through regional economic and social integration.  
 
The transnational character of these conflicts is manifested by an influx of 
small arms and light weapons, large refugee outflows, illicit trade in 
natural resources and cross border rebel movements, all of which 
inevitably affect the security situation in neighboring states. In some 
instances, rebel groups have fled to nearby states to launch their 
insurgencies, such as northern Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
rebels operating from Southern Sudan, and Rwandan rebels operating from 
the eastern DRC. According to Jackson (2002, 2007), intra-states conflicts 
will continually threaten African states, given that most states are weak and 
poor. He further suggests that most of the state government machinery in 
Africa such as administration, security sector, justice system, parliament 
and local structure are either non-existent or fail to work properly.13 
Similarly to Brown (1996: 573) and Cilliers (2004: 27), he argues that the 
underlying African peace and security crisis is a serious developmental 
failure, resulting from bad policy, poor governance and structural factors 
such as a weak state.  
 
                                                 
13See also Nathan 2001: 2 for a similar observation. 




The fourth challenge is associated with election-related violence. Following 
the introduction of multi-party systems in Africa in the 1990s, there has 
been an escalation of more election-related conflicts and political violence 
than ever before in the SADC region and Africa in general. To-date, 
Southern African states having experienced election-related violence 
include Zanzibar (part of Tanzania), Zimbabwe, Lesotho and, Madagascar.  
 
Besides the SADC region, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea 
already have also experienced such violence, with the trend repeating itself 
from one election to another. Free and fair elections have become a rare 
event in these countries, and subsequent elections have become a primary 
source of conflict, instability and insecurity. For instance, more than 30 
Zimbabweans died, with dozens injured and thousands displaced during 
the post-election political violence of 2008 (Mail and Guardian 14.05.2008a). 
There are several reasons sparking election-related violence.14 For instance, 
a report from the AU Panel of the Wise cited the election-related violence in 
Africa as a sign of weakness in the administration of the election, 
governance, and a lack of impartial judiciaries to interpret and adjudicate 
electoral disputes (AU, 2010: 20).  
 
A similar report from the UNDP (2009: 15-17) provides list of underlying 
and proximate causes of election-related violence, including weak 
governance, corruption, biased media and security and policing. Tanki 
Mothae, former director of the SADC Organ, states that election-related 
violence is one of the challenges confronted by organisations in the 
democracy project since the early 2000s.15 He added that post-election 
violence raises special challenges to peace and security in the region. In 
fact, states and especially their incumbent presidents are often to blame for 
these disturbances, despite being aware of new norms and standards of 
democratic governance adopted by regional bodies such as “SADC 
Principles and Guideline: Governance Democratic Election” of 2005 and 
Article 5 of the SADC Treaty, and the NEPAD and its peer review 
mechanisms. When incumbents lose elections they often refuse to accept 
the results,16recently Zanzibar presidential election stalemate exemplified 
this statement. 
 
                                                 
14There is currently no accepted definition of election-related violence, and many definitions 
strongly rely upon elements of intent or motive. In these definitions, violence is “election 
violence” if carried out with the intent to influence the election in some way. 
15Interview with Tanki Mothae, Gaborone, 06.05.2013. 
16Ibid. 





Therefore, a further challenge for the SADC body is reviving political will 
and creating a new neutral space for citizens’ participation and confidence 
in various aspects of the country’s governance process. Given that election-
related conflicts are escalating more than ever before, the organisation finds 
it difficult to gain potential mediators from within national boundaries. The 
international community has been frequently forced to walk the thin line 
between respecting the sovereignty of concerned nations while 
simultaneously placing high regard upon universal principles such as the 
responsibility to protect in cases where disputes spill over into fully-blown 
conflicts. 
 
The fifth challenge is related to worrying trend of constitutional 
amendments aimed at extending the mandates of incumbent president 
which has led to a number of tensions on the SADC regional and Africa at a 
largely. Recent years have witnessed Presidents of Namibia, Angola, 
Uganda, Burundi, Zimbabwe and Rwanda successfully extending their 
power beyond the constitutionally permitted two terms. Similar but 
unsuccessfully attempted to have their constitutions changed to allow them 
an additional term in office was followed in Zambia’s President Frederick 
Chiluba in 2001, and Malawi’s President Bakili Mulizi in 2003 and DRC’s 
Joseph Kabila in 2015. All those attempts to abolish term limits sparked 
public demonstration and unrest by citizens. This trend continues in 
neighbouring countries of SADC, specifically Burundi and Rwanda which 
also sparked unrest from citizens. This situation exemplify the growing 
trend of abolishing presidential terms limits without concert of citizens 
which often leads to protracted in court, on the street or in the worst cases a 
military crackdown or civil war. 
 
The sixth challenge relates to the lack of common political values from 
SADC member states. Despite the SADC having adopted a number of steps 
towards harmonising the continent’s numerous security initiatives, 
including the creation of the SADC Standby Force and the Regional Early 
Warning System, a lack of common regional values binding members of the 
SADC remain an obstacle hindering a real approach of peace and security. 
Franke (2007) noted five possible causes of such divisions: divisions in the 
mode of administration; the lure of nationalism; institutional weaknesses; 
and personal powers policies. Franke’s explanation is evident in the SADC 
where most of the member states do not trust each other, with competition 
on various matters concerning how to move forward for peace and security 
plans (Nathan, 2004, 2006a; CCR, 2005: 30). The empirical findings of this 
study note that two camps persist in the region, one of which includes 




Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and South Africa. According to them, 
the states under this camp recognise the SADC Organ as a security regime 
whose primary basis favours multinational cooperation and peace-making, 
while the second camp comprising Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
favours a Mutual Defence Pact and has prioritised military cooperation and 
responses to conflict.17 This problem emerged as apparent during the crises 
in the DRC conflict in 1998, whereby member states from the two camps 
criticized each other regarding how to deal with the DRC conflict 
(Nkiwane, 2003: 67-69; Nathan, 2006: 280-283). The above division has led 
SADC to have poor a record of peace making in the region (Schalkwayk, 
2005: 37; Nathan, 2006a: 612). Its lack of common political values is similar 
to other RECs in Africa, where some of the states forge regional ties 
without any attempts to create common principles and values for a shared 
regional identity.  
 
The seventh challenge is associated with external interferences mainly from 
former colonial masters. This perhaps is another of the most significant 
challenges facing the SADC in addressing current security threats in the 
regional. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, incidents of Western 
countries led by Britain, France and the USA interfering with domestic 
affairs of SADC member states have increased. In an interview, 
Maaparankoe Mahao18 stated that such Western countries use aggressive 
foreign policies towards Africa, and especially in Southern Africa, to 
protect their own interests. Most of these policies are very destructive, 
causing security problems and undermining the region’s development 
process. He further highlighted that Western countries currently work 
openly with rebels in order to overthrow legitimate governments for their 
own interests. For example, evidence exists that France played a significant 
role in the Madagascar coup of 17 March, 2009 with favour of Andry 
Rajoelina (Ellis, 2009: 30-31). Similar explanations emerged from Cawthra 
(2010: 16), namely that “immediately after the Madagascar coup of March 
2009 the French government was quick to work with Rajoelina, and gave 
him protection during and after the coup”. France’s behaviour is contrary 
to Article 4(p) of the AU’s Constitutive Act, which condemns and rejects 
unconstitutional changes of governments. Furthermore, Article 30 of the 
Act restricts any government that comes to power through unconstitutional 
means from being allowed to participate in AU’s activities.   
 
                                                 
17  See also Omari and Macaringue 2001; van Schalkwyk 2005: 38 for a similar observation. 
18Interview with Brig. Gen. Maaparankoe, Mahao, Gaborone 03.05.2014. 





Similar situation occurred in Zimbabwe whereby the British and their allies 
used an aggressive foreign policy towards regime change in Zimbabwe, for 
instance by using the Westminster Foundation for Democracy to fund the 
opposition, mainly the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), with 
commitment to free-market policies and the restoration of white farms to 
their owners. In addition British and its allies that is USA and Australia 
have imposed economic sanctions on the Zimbabwean government and 
individuals close to President Mugabe. 
 
In contrast, SADC opposed the economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe, 
which have had detrimental effects on the people and hindering economic 
development in the SADC region (see AU, 2009; SADC, 2009). The 
sanctions generally brought Zimbabwe’s economy to its knees with a high 
rate of inflation, unemployment and poor standards of living. In an 
interview with SADC Organ officials on 3 May 2014, they admitted that 
despite problems related with the “fast-track” land reform programme 
conducted since 2000, foreign interference in the land reform exaggerated 
the problem through an openly sponsored campaign to see Robert Mugabe 
ousted. Accordingly, western interference can only make the process of 
stability in the country and economic solution more difficult. In this 
regards this paper argues that Zimbabwe needs to find its own path to a 
peaceful political revolution, rather than those imposed from outside. 
 
The eighth challenge is transnational security threats such as maritime 
piracy which is a growing threat for security in the eastern part of the 
SADC region. Since the collapse of the Somalia state in early 1990s, the 
country has become a breeding ground for pirates, which have posed a 
threat to international trade and security. In the mid 2000s, Somalia pirates 
conducted maritime piracy along the coast of Somalia, Red Sea and in the 
Gulf of Aden (Middleton, 2008; Onuoha, 2009).  
 
However, since 2009, pirates have extended their reach to the Southern part 
of Africa, threatening not only the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and East coast of 
Somali, but also the south-eastern coast from Kenya, Tanzania to 
Mozambique, Madagascar and Mauritius territorial waters, affecting 
people who use the sea and economies of all countries surrounding the 
horn of Africa, and SADC member states (Onuoha, 2009: 35). For example, 
Tanzania has experienced almost 30 accidents of pirate attacks (Coetzee, 
2011). These accidents not only affect Tanzania but also the whole of 
Eastern and Southern Africa. The spread of piracy in Southern African 
waters took top discussion during the SADC Summit in Windhoek, 




Namibia from 16 to 17 August, 2010. Additionally, the economic and 
security threat posed by piracy in the coast waters of SADC member states 
was noted, especially concerning Seychelles, Mauritius and Tanzania 
(SADC, 2010a).  
 
Similarly SIPO II mentions maritime piracy as one of the areas of concern in 
the region (see SADC, 2010b: 37, 47, 56, and 63). The implication of this 
situation in Southern Africa and SADC is that the pirate threat has become 
a reality (Coetzee, 2011). Coetzee (2011) highlights one of the reason why 
pirates have travelled further from the Horn of Africa to the SADC region: 
is because Southern Africa route becomes an alternative route for 
international vessels wishing to avoid the pirates around the Horn of Africa 
by taking the longer route via the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. 
Despite the problem is declining due to the fact that there has no ship 
hijacked in Somalia since 2013. However, many of the root causes are still 
persist, and the network for the piracy operations that have been built up 
have not yet probably not been dismantled.  Therefore, it is believe that 
SADC need to continue address this challenge through expanding its remit 
from counter-piracy to maritime security in general along the coast.  
 
Finally, another major challenge facing the SADC in dealing with security 
issues in Africa is the lack of financial resources for implementing many 
projects related to peace and security at continental and regional levels. 
This situation has become worse. Contributory funding from member 
states is relatively low, resulting in the large dependence on external 
partners.19However, the evolution of the security mechanism of the 
organisation, particularly from the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
(OPDS) to the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 
(OPDSC) and the launching of other security programmes, have further 
underscored the urgency of the regional body to seek alternative funding. 
In order to fill the gap of budgetary deficit, SADC has partially depended 
on grants, donations and loans from external partners, which have 
represented an important means of financing for the organisation and its 
various projects (van Schalkwyk, 2005). Despite Zimbabwean president 
Robert Mugabe urging African leaders, especially from the SADC region, to 
                                                 
19In this study, external actors refer to external development finances, foreign donor 
agencies that are not African in origin, for example foreign donor agencies, donor countries 
and the international development agencies such as UNDP, GIZ and USAID. External 
actors’ support to the SADC has involved a number of issues and programmes in the SADC 
region, including peace and security, good governance, political integration, strengthening 
of the SADC secretariat and infrastructure development (water, telecommunication and 
energy). 





pool resources for development and cut down dependency on donor funds 
during the SADC Summit in Windhoek, Namibia from 16-17 August, 2010 
(Njini, 2010), to-date there has been no change towards ensuring that SADC 
reduces donor dependency. This means that external partners have 
emerged as crucial stakeholders in SADC’s development, playing an 
essential role in supporting the regional organisation in confronting its 
peace and security challenges (Tjønneland, 2006; Klingebiel et al,. 2008). For 
instance, sixty percent of the SADC Budget of 2006-2007 was provided by 
external actors.20 
 
Therefore, it is notedin this paper from the preceding discussions that the 
challenges of peace and security facing the Southern African are not only 
primarily military, but also political, economic and social in nature. Poverty 
and social inequality, as well as lack of good governance, are at the heart of 
the region’s instability and insecurity. Accordingly, the following section 
examines how SADC has addressed peace and security challenges, 
particularly those resulting from member states such as Malawi, 
Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the DRC, to mention but a few, which provide 
useful benchmarks for assessing SADC’s overall normative and 
institutional capacity. 
 
SADC Responses to Address Challenges to Peace and Security 
Since its restructuring in 2001, SADC, and particularly OPDSC, has been 
busy trying to calm current security challenges within the region. In order 
to deal with peace and security challenges, since earlier 2000s  SADC 
initiating various legal instruments that define norms, standards, rules and 
decision-making procedures agreed by all member states. These legal 
instruments include various forms of treaties, protocols, principles and 
guidelines, whose mandates include prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts in the region. For instance, the founding SADC’s 
Treaty commits member states to peace and security, human rights, 
democracy, rule of law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes (SADC, 
1992a: 5). In this respect, SADC Treaty is very informative about regional 
challenges and what needs to be achieved. The protocols, declarations, 
Mutual Defence Pact and the MoU have provided equally clear directions 
in supporting a regional agenda. Additionally, SIPO as the implementation 
framework of the Organ Protocol emphasizes a need for peace, security 
and democratic consolidation in the region (SADC, 2003: 20), including the 
development of principles governing democratic elections to enhance the 
                                                 
20Interview with Habib Kambanga, Gaborone, 04.05.2015. 




transparency and credibility of elections and democratic governance, as 
well as ensuring the acceptance of elections results by all contesting parties.  
 
Furthermore, in addressing conflicts and instability that have tended to 
escalate during and around elections in many Southern African states, 
SADC has developed several norms, principles and guidelines for 
conducting free and fair elections in the region between 2001 and 2004. For 
instance, SADC Parliamentary Forum Plenary Assembly, in Windhoek, 
Namibia adopted norms and standards for the election in SADC region on 
25 March, 2001, which was followed by the adoption of an election 
observation guide for members of parliament in the same year and place. In 
Durban, South Africa, SADC’s Heads of States and Governments put 
another election instrument in place in 2004, namely the principles and 
guidelines governing democratic elections in the region. This initiatives 
clearly set the stage for SADC’s efforts towards acceptable, credible and 
legitimate elections, conducted based on a level playing field and with 
minimum incidences of violence and conflicts. Among other things, the 
SADC principles and guidelines for elections commit member states to the 
following important principles: acceptance and respect of election results 
by political parties proclaimed as free and fair by the competent National 
Electoral Authorities in accordance with the law; full participation of 
citizens in the political process; political tolerance; independence of the 
judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions; and equal 
opportunity for all political parties to access the state media (SADC, 2003).  
 
These principles do not fundamentally differ from those adopted in 2001. 
Apart from the election principles and guidelines, SADC is party to various 
declarations of the UN committing member states to democratic 
governance and respect and observance of human rights, as enshrined in 
the 1949 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Despite the 
aforementioned increased prevention and reaction capacities of the 
regional body, internal conflicts and other related crisis still occur and there 
is no sign of an end. The crises in the DRC, Zimbabwe and recently, in 
Madagascar provide this study with useful benchmarks for assessing 
SADC’s overall normative and institutional capacity.  
 
In addressing problem associated with poverty and social inequality, as 
previously highlighted there is relevant instruments in place for addressing 
poverty reduction namely the RISDP and PRSP. Unfortunately there is no 
relief, as citizens in the regional remain in extreme poverty. Interview with 
SADC official highlights that it is difficulty to eradicate poverty and 
inequality in the regional for the reasons that many governments do not 





promote the interest of the poor, rather spending taxpayer’s money on 
frivolous expenses that only worsen the impact.  Similar to RISDP notes the 
lack of good governance is one the main reasons for the increasing level of 
poverty and social inequality in the region (SADC, n.d: 17). Resultant 
effects include a further rise in poverty, social inequality, socio-economic 
woes and cultural tensions among different groups. This means, poverty 
and inequality will persist due to the fact that there is a clear indication that 
the problem is not or inadequately addressed properly in the 
implementation of the RISDP and other SADC poverty eradication 
framework. 
 
Why Challenges Persist and how to avoid them 
As we leant earlier in this paper, the fundamentals of an effective and 
morally acceptable response to the challenges are already articulated in the 
SADC Treaty, Protocols, guidelines and resolutions, which sets out the core 
responsibilities that organization and states have towards addressing 
various challenges facing the region. In spite of all above efforts  some of 
security challenges persist in the region, among these include attempts to 
abolish a presidential  two-term limits, post-election related violence, poor 
governance as well as social inequality to mention but a few.  
 
Increasing attempts at presidential term extension by some of the 
governments of the SADC member states and its surrounding neighbours 
is perhaps the biggest challenges which still continue and seem like no sign 
to end soon. As we noted earlier SADC and AU adopted several 
declarations in their quest to ensure the rule of law and good governance, 
but the implementation on the ground is challenging due to lack of political 
will from head of states. As noted earlier in recent years Africa has 
witnessed a number of heads of state particularly long-servicing leaders 
attempting to extend their tenure beyond the constitutionally permitted 
number of terms. Sam Nujoma of Namibia, Yoweli Museveni of Uganda, 
Paul Kagame and Nkurunziza of Burundi all have amended their 
constitutions to allow them to stand for a third term in office, and all won 
subsequent re-elections. And in the DRC, it is still unclear what President 
Joseph Kabila’s next move will be. This new political culture of abolishing 
presidential term hinders the process towards prospects of good 
governance, peace and security in the SADC regional. In order to address 
this challenge SADC need to come with another mechanism such as 
reviving SADC Tribunal which was suspended in 2010 and total 
dissolution in 2011 in the SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit of heads of states 
and governments in Windhoek, Namibia (SADC, 2011). SADC tribunal will 




help citizens recourse to justice when term limit, rule of law, democracy 
and good governance, are ignored by their own governments. 
 
Issue of violence related to electoral processes is another challenge facing 
SADC today. Although the regional body adopted norms and standards for 
the election in 2001and 2004 unfortunately the norms have been not 
followed, as a result most of elections in Southern Africa are marred by 
violence at various stages of election process. For example the 2004 SADC 
Principles and Guidelines have often not been observed by individual 
member states, and have been occasionally disregarded by the organisation 
itself, as in the cases of elections in Zimbabwe and DRC in 2005 and 2011 
respectively. In addition, elections are often poorly managed, and 
sometimes subject to rigging, irregularities, and weak independent 
oversight which lead to violence. Although this paper focuses on the 
Southern Africa, this challenge is not uncommon in other African countries. 
With the Kenyan post-election violence still fresh in our minds, were are 
currently witnessing in Burundi and Uganda elections which were 
characterized by torture, assassination, unlawful arrest, detention, 
destruction of campaign rallies and public meetings as well as destruction 
of properties. In addition, annulling a presidential election of 2015 in 
Zanzibar by the Chairman of Electoral body without announcing the result 
to serve the interest of the ruling part that is Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 
to the disadvantage of opposition parties exemplified how the problem is 
acute in SADC member states and its neighbours. This situation is not only 
harming societies in the states concerned, but also it is undermining SADC 
region and its neighboring countries stability. The most notable security 
implication from above mentioned states is collapse of public order, 
militarization of state and society, internal displacement, and flow of 
refugees. Moreover, this scenario indicates that electoral management 
bodies in some of SADC member states have suffered from significant 
capacity, competence, and credibility deficits. 
 
In attempting to address the challenge of election-related violence in SADC 
region, first there is much need for sufficient political will from member 
states to address the weakness in their election management bodies, by 
building the capacity of election management bodies to deliver their 
constitutional mandate. Reforms need to start from member states level to 
strengthening their electoral system, rule of law and to apply principles 
and standard.  Therefore, the successful of SADC to address electoral-
related violence depends on the role played by individual member states. 
The former option involves member states taking all necessary measures to 
support  SADC in reviewing their existing treaties and protocols in order to 





provide much needed power to SADC Organ to address violence related to 
election processes.  
 
Good political governance is another challenge persisting among SADC 
member states. Despite the fact that member states recognize one of the 
main pillar of SADC integration agenda is good political governance; 
meaning SADC member states must respect the rule of law, and have a 
democratic system where the judiciary is independent. As previously 
shown although a number of efforts made by SADC focusing on 
emphasizing on the elements of good governance and it impact on 
development,21 unfortunately this challenge still persists in devastating rate 
as if there are no any efforts made by regional body to address it before.  As 
a result most of low income people suffer from the consequence of lack of 
good governance. Among the consequence of poor governance Southern 
African citizens suffer today include weak governance, absence of 
monitoring institutions which seriously affects economic growth and 
poverty reduction in all member states. In order to address security 
challenges, poverty and other social issues SADC member states must 
address lack of good governance in order to pull out from insecurity and 
poverty. In addition member states need to offer greater power to SADC in 
order for them to make decisions without undue influence.  This 
suggestion arises from SADC policies not originating from SADC 
Secretariat, rather that regional body depended on policy made by 
individual nations with SADC Secretariat only able to attempt to persuade 
them. Thus, SADC need more political space to deal with those challenges 
internally in atmosphere of calm without political pressures from states 
and interest groups. 
 
Lastly, despite the fact that this paper didn’t discuss in detail threats of 
terrorism as challenges to regional security in Southern Africa, the regional 
body need to address this problem in effectively manner, the rising of 
terrorism in the region poses a threat to regional security, to the values of 
local societies and to the freedoms of citizens. Since the events of terrorist 
attack in Tanzania in (1998), Kenya (1998, 2013 and 2014), as well rising 
number of militant Islamic attacks that have targeted local community and 
foreign tourists, in Zanzibar and Mombasa, it indicates that terrorism threat 
do not recognize borders, thus SADC should view itself as a target of active 
international and local terrorist groups.  
                                                 
21The concept of good governance has been clarified by the UN's Commission on Human 
Rights and identified the key attributes of good governance as Transparency, responsibility, 
accountability, participation, and responsiveness. 




In addition this situation should serve as a wake-up call for SADC to 
develop comprehensive regional strategies, plans and guidelines for 
preventing and combat acts of international and local terrorism within 
member states. Although the UN have Global Counter Terrorism Strategy 
of 2016, and the AU have a Counter Terrorism Framework of 2002 these are 
not enough to protect SADC region. SADC need to take preventive 
measures this is due to the fact that global security is deteriorating and they 
cannot take UN and AU terrorism framework for granted. SADC need to 
have its own proactive strategy, which can be embedded to the continental 
counter terrorism framework. Also SADC can utilize banking on good 
relations with the states surrounding its member states in terms of giving 
information of any suspicious people through early warning mechanism. 
Therefore, SADC need to develop its own counter terrorism strategy that 
addresses region-specific and realities.  
 
Conclusion  
As exemplified by the above discussion, the paper demonstrated that the 
challenges to peace and security for Southern Africa are diverse and pose 
great demands on a regional security apparatus. Some of these challenges 
are emanating from bad governance, unconstitutional changes of 
governments, unequal distribution of resources among citizens; 
amendment of the constitutional to remove presidential term limits and 
contested electoral results. These challenges are among the most prominent 
sources of instability confronted by SADC. 
 
Furthermore, the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar, 
and removed presidency term limits in Angola and Namibia and similar 
attempts in Zambia, Malawi and DRC has once again brought this reality to 
the fore, reminding SADC and the international community a need to act 
decisively in these growing challenges and threats to security in Southern 
Africa. Unfortunately the effectiveness of SADC legal and political 
framework in dealing with this phenomenon is seriously questioned, as 
most of the challenges still exist to-date and show no sign of shrinking. As 
mentioned earlier in this paper SADC needs more experience and time for 
the successful evolvement in dealing with different kinds of challenges 
emerged in the Southern Africa. In addition, individual member states 
need to support SADC for following up the implementation of legal 
instruments.  
 
This paper argues that despite the process of implementation of various 
policies related to governance needs time by the regional body, there is 
currently a substantial gap between what is written in the legal instruments 





and policy paper and what is actually happening on the ground. Therefore, 
SADC and member states need to address those challenges through 
revising their legal instruments particularly at state level in order to be 
mutual compatible; they need to change behaviour affecting the regional 
body attaining prosperous peace and security. This means that to address 
challenges which still continue to hurt SADC and its member states will not 
only be realized through the adoption of “nice” legal documents and 
agreement amongst member states on principles, rules and norms, but also 
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